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Abstract
The paper considers the complex process of introducing a regime of shorter working hours in the 
private security sector in South Africa. While the process of reducing the working hours of security 
workers in 1999 was bold, there is potential for real gains and losses to be derived from the 
process and this depends on the system and levels of compensation that are negotiated for the 
period of transition to the new schedules in working hours. A reduction in normal working hours 
can affect the size of the normal wage and it has an impact on the proportion of remuneration that 
can be earned from overtime work. A tension can exist between the method of compensating 
wages during the phase in which working hours are being reduced. This tension exists between 
maintaining the old hourly rate or maintaining the old aggregate salary levels of employees. The 
former shifts the burden of a reduction in working hours onto employees, while the latter results in 
the burden falling upon employers. The former path was the one followed when working hours 
were reduced in the South African security sector. Where the old hourly rate is maintained, a 
reduction in working hours will not have a dramatic impact on the costs of employers and is 
therefore likely to coincide with an increased demand for labour in the sector. Alternatively, if the 
reduction results in the cost burden being borne solely by employers, particularly through an 
adherence to the old aggregate wage levels, wage employment elasticities suggest that it will 
result in disemployment effects.  The paper contrasts the trade-offs between these distinct 
outcomes.
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1.  Introduction
2.  Wage Regulation in the Security Sector
3.  The Security Sector in South Africa
It is often said that practice is the best test for theory. The realm of practice usually establishes the 
grounds to test a theory to the limit. Perhaps, the difficulties of securing a reduction in working time 
regimes for particular segments of the working population without imposing undue sanctions on 
their material conditions is an instance where this can be demonstrated. A similar qualification 
applies to the operational capacity of employers. It also establishes the grounds where the 
outlines of a new theory can be sketched. The persistence in the practical difficulties to the 
resolution of this objective are more surprising because so much scrutiny has been given to the 
question of the wage, employment and cost impact of a reduction in working hours in the 
theoretical and scholarly literature. What are the practical difficulties and why do they persist? Our 
analysis of the experience in securing a new regime in the length of normal and overtime working 
time for workers in the South African security sector highlights the complexities and difficulties 
associated with the process.
The wages and conditions of employment for the majority of employees in the security industry 
has until recently been covered by a wage determination agreement. The last wage determination 
agreement, Wage Determination 481 for the Security Services Trade was gazetted in 1998. The 
agreement acknowledged the historically differentiated working hour schedules for security 
guards by transmitting and specifying these into the agreement. This differentiated classification 
occurred for category A and category B security officers. Excluding overtime requirements, the 
maximum ordinary hours of work for security officers within Category A, was 48 hours per week. 
For Category B security officers the limit for ordinary working hours was set at 60 hours per week.
By 1999, the revision of the entire battery of labour legislation in South Africa had been virtually 
completed. With the exception of amendments to the existing legislative provision with respect to 
the labour market, which will take place intermittently, the new agreements between specific 
parties in an industry are beginning to incorporate the broader changes in labour legislation. The 
most far-reaching change, which resulted from the promulgation of a new Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act in 1997 was the provision for a drastic reduction in ordinary working hours and 
the imposition of limits to the length of overtime hours that employees covered by the jurisdiction 
of the Act were required to render. Consequently, the establishment of a new Determination for 
employees in the Security Sector not covered by a bargaining council agreement was designated 
as Sectoral Determination 3 of 2000 and the central objective conveyed through its provisions is 
to establish conformity between the working hour regimes in the industry with that contained in the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act. The Sectoral Determination regulates the conditions of 
employment of employees in the security sector who were not already covered by an agreement.  
Examples of those who fall outside the ambit of the new determination are security employees 
covered by in-house agreements or bargaining council agreements such as that for the Road 
Freight Industry (Government Gazette No.22102, 1 March 2001).
Over the last decade, the security industry in South Africa has experienced one of the most rapid 
trends in employment growth. A plethora of organisations representing the interests of employers 
and unions have also mushroomed as a consequence of these growth trends. By 1996, 2200 
private security guard companies had registered with the Security Officers’ Board and it was 
estimated that more than 650 companies had done so annually since 1991 (Star 8/4/1996). The 
large-scale entry of firms to the industry has also been characterised by large -scale exit as 
security firms have tried to balance their presence in the industry with the intense competition for 
business. But the industry has also been associated with a rather fragile and explosive industrial 
relations climate with intensive 
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national and regional strike activities occurring at various points during this period.
Research conducted by the Institute of Race Relations showed that the number of private security 
companies had more than doubled from 2600 in 1994 to 5586 in 1998. While there were 128 000 
active private security officers in the guarding industry in South Africa in 1998, there were also 188 
000 security officers who were inactive: being registered but not employed. In addition to those 
employed in the guarding sector of the private security industry there were some 200 000 in-house 
security guards, 50 000 security personnel in the alarm systems sector, 40 000 in general services 
and 20 000 in response services. The ratio of personnel in the private security industry (all 
categories) to uniformed police officials was 4:1. The ratio of private security guards (in-house and 
contract) to uniformed police officials was 3:1 (South African Institute of Race Relations, South 
Africa Survey 1999-2000, p.74). By January 2000, the number of private security officers active 
throughout the country had increased to 163 545. Estimates put the industry's turnover in 2000 at 
roughly R12 billion a year slightly lower than the R15.45 billion that was allocated to the police 
budget in 2000/01 (South African Institute of Race Relations, South Africa Survey 2000/2000, 
p.141).
Among the major issues of contention for employers in the industry is the relatively low economic 
barriers to entry. This imposes severe constraints on established firms in the sector to defend their 
share of the market by having to resort to similar tactics as those engaged by many of the new 
entrants. Consequently, this exerts pressure on particular aspects of the expenditure by firms in 
the sector and as 'soft targets', conditions of employment are normally the first items that are either 
overlooked or abrogated by employers. Even government departments and agencies, have been 
accused of contributing to the perpetuation of a climate of intense price competitiveness through 
its tendering process by usually accepting the lowest bid. Self-regulation merely reinforces the 
standards of the group that are the lowest common denominator among employers and 
establishes these as the standards for the industry as a whole.  Increased competition between 
firms in the industry and higher insurance premiums have been identified as the key factors 
eroding profit margins.
Some firms have been attempting to establish a niche as hi-tech security firms but the start-up 
costs associated with this move are estimated to be very high (Financial Mail, 5/3/99). As a result it 
is forecast that rationalisation in the industry could take the form of mergers and consolidations.  A 
stark example of such an occurrence has been the merger between Fidelity Guards and Khulani 
Security in 2000. Diversification and the need to gain market share and maintain profit levels 
through economies of scale has encouraged some of the larger players in the field such as Coin, 
Fidelity, Khulani and Gray to develop a client base in African countries outside South Africa.  Apart 
from its core function in the cash-in-transit and guarding services, Fidelity for instance has 
attempted to cultivate and grow 'low-tech' services such as contract cleaning, office hygiene, pest 
control and the provision of indoor plants to corporate clients. Gray Security provides protection for 
less tangible assets, such as electricity and water supply depots (Financial Mail 5/3/99).
The obverse to the intense price competitiveness of the industry was a situation of neglected 
employment conditions for the majority of security personnel in the sector. It is here that firms fail to 
comply with regulations and standards set out by government agencies such as the Employment 
Conditions Commission. The rapid employment growth in the industry and the profit squeeze on 
employers gave rise to a situation in which employment growth was being registered at the lower 
end of the skills spectrum. In 1997 the media reported that three quarters of security guards and 
officers were entrenched at the bottom rung of the qualifications scale possessing mostly an E-
grade qualification (Star 21/4/1997). While the grading structure was generic to the industry as a 
whole and symptomatic of the skills pool from which new recruits were drawn into the industry, a 
range of pressing issues were identified as the crux of the trade union negotiations with employers 
in the 1997 round of wage negotiations. The issues identified by trade unions was the need to 
establish a national provident fund for security workers, a guaranteed 13th cheque for all security 
officers and guards as well as the payment of allowances for dog and firearm handling.
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4.  Character of the Industry
There is a significant variation in the estimate of the number of employees in the Security Industry. 
The Joint Professional Security Employer Alliance estimates there to be 191 413 employees, of 
whom 188 383 are registered as active Security Officers. The residual is made up of employees 
who occupy support staff positions and security officers who fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
sectoral determination agreement. Unlike the case for domestic workers, the October Household 
Surveys does not allow categorical breakdowns to be derived on the employment profiles of 
security officers, security guards and night watchmen/women. Instead, these employment 
categories are spread through a number of sub-divisions. These include the police services, the 
prison services, rescue services, the emergency rescue services, the transport services and the 
delivery services. Essentially therefore, the work of security officers is interspersed within all these 
sub-divisions. Until more accurate job categories are captured through the October Household 
Surveys, the figures of the Joint Professional Security Employers Association are the only 
indicators of employment levels in the sector at our disposal.
Further breakdowns of the distribution of employment according to categories that are pertinent to 
our analysis is however available to ‘insiders’ in the industry. Although the Joint Professional 
Security Employer Alliance is unable to provide exact breakdowns of the grades into which its 
employees are classified, the Alliance provides the following estimates based on information 
received from the Security Officers Interim Board:
The Joint Professional Security Employer Alliance however add the following qualification to the 
above ratios: ‘Actual employment figures may, however, vary, as many security officers are over 
trained and are employed at lower grades than at which they are trained’. This means that many 








Grade E 7765 4 
Grade D 13588 7 
Grade C 77645 41 
Grade B 50469 26 
Grade A 38823 20 
Other (Support Staff) 3030 2 
Total 191413 100 
 
Table 1: Estimate Number of Employees in Employment Grades
Source: Submission by the Joint Professional Security Employer Alliance to the Employment 
Conditions Commission (13 March 2001)
 * Signifies calculation excluding employees not covered by the Determination Agreement.
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5.  Sectoral Determination No. 3
Previous determinations made provision for different normal working hours to be specified for 
security officers. These ranged from 48 hours for those classified in Category A to 60 hours for 
those in Category B. All other remaining employees had a normal working week of 46 hourswhich 
was set according to the earlier Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1983). The Sectoral 
Determination Number 3 set out to change these. It did so by adopting a key long-term objective of 
the new Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 concerning ‘the progressive reduction of the 
maximum ordinary hours of work to a maximum of 40 ordinary hours of work per week and eight 
ordinary hours of work per day’ (Basic Conditions of Employment Act No.75 of 1997, clause 9 (3). A 
rapid time-frame for the phasing of shorter working hours was introduced into the determination 
agreement with the ultimate aim of abolishing the distinction between the two different categories 
of security officers, and secure an alignment between the provision of ordinary working hours. The 
agreement was signed by the Minister and gazetted on 25 February 2000. The agreement 
conveys the intention of the Ministry of Labour to reach a 45 hour ordinary working week for all 
employees including all security officers within three years from its date of gazetting. The 
agreement makes immediate provision for all employees in the security industry who are not 
security officers to work no longer than 45 ordinary hours of work per week.
In order to collapse the two categories (category A and B) that demarcates security officers into 
one category, the determination provides for the ordinary hours of work of security officers who 
were required to work 60 ordinary hours in a week to be immediately reduced to 55 hours.  
Limitations on the working of overtime were set to correspond with those contained in the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (1997). The determination agreement further pronounced that at 
the end of the first year, the ordinary hours of security officers who were required to work 55 
ordinary hours a week would be reduced further to 50 hours. At the end of the second year and the 
commencement of the third year, security staff working longer than 45 hours per week, would have 
their ordinary working hours reduced to the maximum 45 hour limit. Doing so means that the 
normal working hours for security workers would be brought into alignment and would also comply 
with the provisions of the country's labour legislation. This would include those security officers 
working on an ordinary weekly working hour schedule of 50 hours and those on the 48 hour 
working schedule. So the reduction in the ordinary hours for those on the 48 hour  weekly 
schedule only comes into effect at the beginning of the third year of the Labour Minister's order that 
sets the sectoral determination.
Once the ordinary hours of work for all security officers is standardised to 45 hours per week, the 
previous differentiation along categories (categories A and B) falls into abeyance. However the 
present grading system that remunerates security officers in particular by qualifications, that are 
regulated through the Security Officers’ Board and recognised throughout the industry, will 
continue to form the basis of promotion and remuneration. These instruments grade security 
officers from Grade A at the upper remuneration scale to Grade E at the bottom. The salary or 
wage differential between these grades is almost double and ranges roughly between 1.85 and 
1.98.  This data is shown in Table 2 below. Only through the systematic improvement in 
qualifications can security officers proceed through the grading structure and so benefit from 
higher rates of remuneration paid in higher grades.
While the reduction in working hours leads to a corresponding decline in the earnings derived from 
normal working time, the reductions do not affect earnings from overtime nor does it affect 
earnings attributed to bonuses. In fact, with the fall in earnings, allowance has been provided for 
an incremental adjustment to the annual bonus and although this does not provide compensation 
for the decline in aggregate earnings which the reduction in working hours causes, the earnings 
derived from the annual bonus shows an upward movement. This has been achieved by changing 
the manner by which the annual bonus is calculated.
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While the annual bonus is awarded as a lump sum at the end of a calendar year, the calculation to 
dis-aggregate it into discrete monthly lumps has the effect of marginally increasing the monthly 
wage and salary remuneration of security officers.  It does so in a way that compensates them 
nominally for the loss of earnings as a result of the reduced ordinary working hours, which the 
sectoral determination specifies for the first to the third years of the agreement. The compensation 
however only protects the nominal value of monthly remuneration. Depending on the inflation rate 
per annum for succeeding years, there will be a real reduction in earnings. An example of the 
minimum monthly wage and salary rates that apply to Security Officers who work in from Grades A 
to E in Area A, for the period in which the provision of the Sectoral Determination apply is shown in 
Table 2.
Under an economic dispensation of high rates of inflation, the erosion in the real wage will be high: 
under an economic dispensation of low rates of inflation, the erosion in the real wage will be lower. 
By incorporating the change that an adjustment in the coefficient of the formula makes to the 
increase in the overall bonus payable to an employee, as a result of the reduction in normal 
working hours, one would be able to measure the effect this has on overall income. For the three 
years in which the reduction in hours of work have been designed to take place, the coefficient by 
which bonuses are calculated is increased from 0.34 in the first year to 0.56 in the second year and 
again to 0.78 in the third year. Thereafter it is normalised at a value of 1. The logic for this is to 
mitigate the drastic fall in wages and salaries for employees while providing for a phased 
adjustment in costs to employers. Zachmann (1986: 165) refers to such incremental adjustments 
as 'hours-dependent non-wage expenditures'.
The proportion by which earnings from ordinary hours of work contributes to the take home pay of 
employees will naturally fall when there is a proportionate increase in non-direct remuneration as 
is noticeable with the proportionate increase in remuneration derived from bonuses. The evidence 
5
 
Normal Working Week: 55 Hours (Year 1: 25 Feb 2000-24 Feb 2001) (Assume a 6.5% Wage Increment)
Detail Calculation Grade A (R10.52) Gr.B (R8.60) Gr.C (R6.31) Gr.D (R5.59) Gr.E (R5.22)
Normal Time 55*13/3*Rate 2507.27 2049.67 1503.88 1332.28 1244.10
Overtime 10*13/3*Rate*1.5 683.80 559.00 410.15 363.35 339.30
Annual Bonus 55*Rate*52/12*0.34/12 71.04 58.07 42.61 37.75 35.25
Cleaning Allowance/shift R1.5*13/3 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50
Night Shift Allowance R1.35*7*13/3 40.95 40.95 40.95 40.95 40.95
Total Salary 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10
Normal Working Week: 50 Hours (Year 2: 25 Feb 2001-24 Feb 2002) (Assume a 6.5% Wage Increment)
Detail Calculation Grade A (R11.20) Gr.B (R9.16) Gr.C (R6.72) Gr.D (R5.95) Gr.E (R5.56)
Normal Time 50*13/3*Rate 2426.67 1984.67 1456.00 1289.17 1200.33
Overtime 10*13/3*Rate*1.5 728.00 595.40 436.80 386.75 360.10
Annual Bonus 50*Rate*52/12*0.56/12 113.24 92.62 67.95 60.16 56.02
Cleaning Allowance/shift R1.60*13/3 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93
Night Shift Allowance R1.44*7*13/3 43.68 43.68 43.68 43.68 43.68
Total Salary 3318.52 2723.30 2011.36 1786.69 1667.06
Normal Working Week: 45 Hours (Year 3: 25 Feb 2002-24 Feb 2003)
Detail Calculation Grade A (R11.93) Gr.B (R9.76) Gr.C (R7.16) Gr.D (R6.34) Gr.E (R5.92)
Normal Time 45*13/3*Rate 2326.35 1903.20 1396.20 1236.30 1154.40
Overtime 10*13/3*Rate*1.5 775.45 634.40 465.40 412.10 384.80
Annual Bonus 45*Rate*52/12*0.78/12 151.21 123.71 90.75 80.36 75.04
Cleaning Allowance/shift R1.70*13/3 7.37 7.37 7.37 7.37 7.37
Night Shift Allowance R1.53*7*13/3 46.41 46.41 46.41 46.41 46.41
Total Salary 3306.79 2715.08 2006.13 1782.54 1668.01
Table 2: Salary and Wage Benefits of Security Officers covered by the Sectoral 
Determination
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shows that at the beginning, during the first year of the agreement when a low coefficient was used 
to calculate staff bonuses, income from ordinary working hours contributed close to 75percent of 
overall income. But it declines consistently thereafter, as a new coefficient for calculating the 
annual bonus is 
introduced at the start of each new year, until income finally falls to just below 66.67 percent for 
some grades in the fourth and final year as can be calculated from Table 2.  It has to be noted 
however that the exact proportion will depend on the grade at which a security officer is classified 
and the geographical area in which the incumbent’s place of work is located. Over the four year 
period during which the introduction of a 45 hour working week has been designed to become 
operational, the proportion of earnings attributed to the annual bonus will double from just over 2 
percent in the first year to between 5 percent and 6 percent during the fourth year.
After accounting for the remuneration of ordinary hours worked, the second highest paying item on 
the payroll of security officers includes the payment for overtime worked. The new determination 
makes provision for a maximum period of three hours overtime per day or ten hours overtime per 
week. Overtime however is not obligatory for employees: they can choose or choose not to work 
overtime. The payment due to overtime worked is at least one and a half times the normal wage 
rate. If overtime is worked to the maximum 10-hour limit per week, the monthly earnings 
contribution to the wages and salaries of security officers varies slightly according to grade but 
amounts to roughly 20 percent.
The determination agreement makes provision for a night shift allowance. The calculation that we 
have provided includes the full amount of the allowance in the overall remuneration package of all 
employees. In reality however, there may be a large degree of variation in the participation of 
security officers in night work: there might be an equivalent dispersion in night shift allocations, 
and some employees will be more inclined to work night shift and some less so. A recent 
submission by the Joint Professional Security Employer Alliance to the Employment Conditions 
Commission (13 March 2001) indicates that all employers who are members of the Alliance 
normally remunerate their employees with a cleaning allowance for every shift completed in a day. 
This means that on a 55 hour working week, just over three shifts will be have been completed 
each week for each occupational category resulting in each employee being awarded with a shift 
allowance of R1.50 per week (R6.80 per month) in 2000 (year one of the Sectoral Determination 
agreement). Again, this is illustrated in Table 2 .
The effect of these costs to employers will be shown in more detail in the wage simulations that will 
be illustrated in the latter part of this document. It should be noticed that not all costs borne by 
employers are conveyed directly as remuneration to employees. Some costs borne by employers 
insure workers against loss of pay that would result in their absence from work which 
unanticipated distresses may cause e.g. family responsibility leave. Other cost items are an 
obligatory rest period that workers are entitled to receive annually and for which they receive a 
wage payment at a rate that corresponds to their full normal working hours (e.g. annual leave). The 
wages that are paid in lieu of annual leave is not an additional income above their wages. 
However, the annual bonus, which is paid as a cumulative amount at the end of the year, normally 
preceding the period of annual leave, is a payment over and above the normal monthly wage and 
salary benefits. In order to factor the monthly effect of this once off payment to employees, our 
analysis disaggregates this to a monthly value, which has been incorporated into our assessment 
of the monthly employee remuneration. Finally, non-remunerative deductions include obligatory 
deductions on the skills levy as well as provident fund deductions, which could become a 
significant future cost item for employers but is really an insurance to provide income to workers 
during retirement.
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6.  Costs to Employers
Using information derived from the Joint Professional Employer Alliance that had previously been 
submitted to the Employment Conditions Commission (13 March 2001), a number of different 
options based on the profile of the current wage costs to employers in the Security Industry, is 
illustrated. Although these represent aggregate figures for the industry, they provide a basis for 
tabulating the impact on costs to employers to implement the shorter working week for security 
officers. These options were devised using two substantially different concepts, which only the 
trilateral discussions between the employer organisations, worker organisations and the 
Department of Labour would be able to resolve. These concepts and the principles on which they 
are postulated are expressed in the following terms:
(a) The principle that dictates  what form compensation can assume in instances where a 
reduction in working hours has taken place is by means of the concept of ‘lower pay for fewer 
hours’. The concept of ‘lower pay for fewer hours’ refers to the reduction in the monthly 
remuneration that employees obtain as a result of the reduction in normal working hours. 
Following the concept of ‘lower pay for fewer hours’, the reduction in hours does not change 
the hourly rate of employee earnings. This also implies that excluding other exogenous 
factors of employment expansion (e.g. growth of services, crime etc.), the need for 
employers to hire additional labour as a result of the reduction in working hours means that 
the wage and salary costs for normal and overtime work will remain unchanged. The cost 
increase of an employment expansion that is determined directly from a reduction in 
working hours therefore can be measured through the costs incurred on ancillary and non-
wage benefits. These include: bonuses (annual, monthly etc), allowances (shift), and leave 
(annual and as is the case for the security sector, family responsibility leave). If the 
aggregate wage costs of employers remain the same, the increase in employment that 
comes about as a result of a reduction in working hours will not change the aggregate 
amount of payroll levies. The payroll levies will only increase if the additional employment 
generates costs to employers, which extend beyond the savings that they make by having to 
pay lower wages for the fewer hours that have been worked. This point is essential to grasp 
because it will form the basis of the tabulation used to generate Tables 5 and 6.
(b) The concept of ‘equal pay for fewer hours’ is the extreme opposite of the concept of ‘lower 
pay  for fewer hours’. This concept is based on the premise that changes in the regimes of
 working time schedules must not be a measure borne solely by employees, because it is a 
compensation for historically evolved changes in labour productivity which have not been 
captured or compensated through wage claims. Under the concept of ‘equal pay for fewer 
hours’, the reduction in normal working hours leaves the final weekly and monthly salary 
packaged unchanged. Consequently, the concept of ‘equal pay for equal hours’ results in 
the hourly wage rate being increased by the proportion of the reduction in working hours. 
While employers are against the concept of ‘equal pay for fewer hours’ being adopted 
because it shifts the cost burden of the reduction onto them, the demand ‘for equal pay for 
fewer hours’ is likely to stem from representatives of the workers. The motivation for the 
demand would be because workers are imputed to experience aggregate salary and wage 
declines as a result of the introduction of shorter working hours.
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7.  Costs to Employers using the Principle of 'Lower Pay for Fewer 
Hours
Without knowing the exact organisational character of specific business enterprises in the security 
sector, particularly with respect to the system of shifts, normal working hours and over-time hours, 
it is difficult to accurately portray the cost impact on employers of shorter normal working hours. 
Information on the breakdown of the shift regimes indicates that services are provided for three 
distinct regimes and is shown in Table 3.
Security firms that provide services for seven days per week will be required to structure their shift 
systems so that it conforms to the ambit of the law. The new provisions affect 60 percent of security 
officers in the industry. Overtime under a 7-day per week service that includes day or night shifts or 
both implies that the work on a Sunday will form part of the overtime segment of the working day. 
The challenge to firms who provide a seven day per week service for 24 hours per day or 168 
hours per week is to develop a shift system which places their employees, in this case, security 
officers, on the maximum normal time and prohibits them from working beyond the maximum 
overtime allowed. Adjustments in the system of shift allocation would have to be introduced for 
every successive reduction in normal working hours, which the legislation specifies.
Roughly, only 10 percent of security officers are on jobs that provide a 5 day service which extends 
over a period of 12 hours. The new provisions in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1997) 
and the Sectoral Determination implies that as the normal level of working hours is reduced, 
security officers in such positions would be remunerated for overtime work. Without rendering 
more time to work, their remuneration as a result of the working hours reduction means that the 
normal time lost will be transferred to time for over-time. The working of over-time will increase 
from zero to the maximum duration permissible.
Overtime for 30 percent of security officers who work on a 5½ working week predominantly in the 
banking and retail sectors according to the Joint Professional Security Alliance is unavoidable.  
This is because it is invariably necessary for the same security officer to be on duty for the full week 
and for full time.
Now, the wide variation in the working cycle of security firms makes it rather difficult to calculate the 
precise impact of changes in working hours because the changes itself induce wide differences in 
the shift systems that are introduced to accommodate these changes. It is therefore necessary to 
work with aggregate data to simulate the effect of these changes. One can use the data supplied 
by the Joint Professional Employer Alliance in its submission to the Employment Conditions 
Commission, as a proxy for current costs to employers. The simulations of the changes in costs to 
employers of reduced hours can be performed using this proxy data.
Shifts on which Services are based Percentage 
7 day per week service (12 or 24 hour, day and/or night shift 60 
5 day per week service (normally 12 hour shifts, Monday to Fridays) 10 
 5½ per week service (banking and retail sectors)  30 
Total  100 
 
Table 3: Distribution of Shift Systems in the Security Sector according to Market 
Breakdown
Source: Submission by the Joint Professional Security Employer Alliance to the 
Employment Conditions Commission
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Table 4 depicts the monthly cost to employers of employing labour on a job schedule for a 24-hour 
day. The calculation is based on the remuneration rates of a Grade E security officer falling under 
Area A but also includes non-remuneration costs which are a cost to the employer. These costs 
include payment to engage staff on public holidays and because there is no obligation for 
employees to work on a public holiday for which they are paid at the normal rate, the employer is 
required to provide double pay to employees who work on such a day. It also includes a maximum 
payment for allowances, bonuses and family responsibility leave as well as the obligatory payroll 
levy for skills development training.
Ignoring for a moment the changes in price level and the reduction in working hours, a simulation 
has been provided for changes in the cost to employers as a result of the incremental increase in 
the annual bonus for employees. Had the reduction in normal working hours not taken place, the 
adjustment in the annual bonus which is a condition laid out in the Sectoral Determination would 
have resulted in the real aggregate labour costs of employers increasing by 1.6 percent in 2001 
and 1.5 percent in 2002.
Using the proxy data contained in Table 4, two scenarios are possible under conditions of a 
reduction in the normal weekly working hours of employees.
a) Measuring the Costs of Hiring Additional Staff
Assuming that the maximum number of permissible overtime is being worked by the existing staff 
complement in the security sector, employers would be compelled to hire additional workers, if the 
reduction in the length of working hours occurs. What will the effect be of a shorter week on the 
labour requirements of firms and what are the costs of the changes that are required? A reduction 
in working hours from 55 to 50 hours implies that the capacity to employ additional labour at no 
extra cost to the wage bill will be equivalent to 9.09percent (5/55*100). This is because the new 
employees will merely fill in vacancies equivalent to the number of hours that a shorter working 
week forgoes in lost production. On an aggregate, a 9.09 percent reduction in working hours 
necessitates a 9.09 percent increase in the demand for additional labour. Once this has been 
accomplished the level of service output is neither more nor less than it was before the reduction in 
working hours: it is exactly the same.  But firms are obliged to honour all new staff members with 
the prevailing conditions of employment that existing members obtain. So all non-wage or indirect 
costs, which are still transmitted as a cost to required in year 2002, the following scenarios are 
illustrated in Table 7.
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Table 4: Current Wage Costs to Employers in the Security Industry on Constant Prices
Detail Calculation Costs in Rands (2000 Constant Prices)
2000 2001 2002
Normal Time (Averaged) 144 hours @ R5.22 3254.77 3254.77 3254.77
Sunday Time 24 hours @ R7.83 813.69 813.69 813.69
Public Holidays 24 hours @ R5.22 125.28 125.28 125.28
Annual Bonus 168 hours*4.33 *R5.22 @2.83% 107.46 177.31 248.23
Cleaning Allowance/shift 168/55*13/3 @ R1.50/week 19.85 19.85 19.85
Provident Fund 0% 0 0 0
Night Shift Allowance R1.35 * 7*13/3 40.95 40.95 40.95
Annual Leave 1 in 17 days 218.91 218.91 218.91
Family Responsibility Leave 3 days per annum 43.78 43.78 43.78
Skills Levy 0.5% of (Normal + Sunday time) 20.34 23.47 23.83
Total Cost 4645.03 4718.01 4789.29
Source: Submission by the Joint Professional Security Employer Alliance to the 
Employment Conditions Commission 
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employers, will increase by 9.09 percent. Essentially therefore, using the data illuminated in Table 
4, a 9.09 percent increment on non-wage costs increases the overall cost to employers by roughly 
1.09 percent (or R50.80 if account is made for the increase in the skills levy). Even taking into 
account the incremental adjustment in the calculation of the annual bonus which increases from a 
factor of 0.34 to 0.56 from the first (year 2000) to the second year (2001) (approximately 65 
percent). From the second to the third year, the factor increases from 0.56 (year 2001) to 0.78 
(2002) (approximately 40 percent). The cost to employers is not as dramatic as the loss of overall 
remuneration is to employees and is shown in Table 5.
Therefore a reduction in working hours of 9.09 percent, which necessitates an equivalent and 
proportionate engagement of new staff personnel and adherence to higher bonuses for all staff 
results in roughly a 2.75 percent workforce cost to employers. While the reduction in working hours 
from 50 to 45 hours amounts to 10 percent and the increase in the factor value used to calculate 
bonuses increases by 40 percent (in contrast to the 65 percent in our example above), the costs to 
employers of hiring additional employees will be marginally higher than the 2.75 percent recorded 
for the Year 2 of the provisions in the Sectoral Determination Agreement. This is shown below in 
Table 6 and is based on constant values, which simulate the upward change in the bonus 
calculation that is contained in Table 4.
This should not be confused with an annual salary increment, which is a requirement if the basic 
employee remuneration is to be kept in line with inflation. Therefore using simulations of a 4 
percent, 6.5 percent and an 8 percent increase in nominal wages over the three year period, 
combined with a 2.75 percent increase in the cost of hiring additional staff members for year 2001 
and the 3 percent 
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Non-wage benefits for new employees (9.09% increase ) 50.80 
Incremental Increase on Bonus Payments 70.20 
Incremental Increase on Bonus Payments for new employees (9.09%) 6.38 
Total costs of engaging new employees and paying higher bonuses 127.38 
Proportionate increase on aggregate cost to employers (ratio on R4645) 2.75% 
 
Table 5: Costs to Employers of Hiring Additional Staff due to a reduction in normal 
working hours from 55 to 50
Cost Item Rands (2000 
constant 
prices) 
Non-wage benefits for new employees (10% increase ) 62.92 
Incremental Increase on Bonus Payments 71.27 
Incremental Increase on Bonus Payments for new employees (10%) 7.13 
Total costs of engaging new employees and paying higher bonuses 141.32 




Table 6: Costs to Employers of Hiring Additional Staff due to a reduction in normal
 working hours from 50 to 45
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The aggregate cost impact, which combines the cost of instituting a shorter working time 
regime with an estimate of the anticipated wage award, is shown in the second column from 
the right in Table 7. Since the hourly rate of remuneration remains the same, the costs to 
employers using the principle of 'lower pay for fewer hours' is as follows:
' If the annual wage award to all security employees for the period of the adjustments in hours is 
fixed at 4 percent, the cost impact on employers will be 6.86 percent for the second year of the 
Sectoral Determination Agreement and 7.12 percent for the third year. This includes the 2.75 
percent cost adjustment to hire 9.09 percent more staff hours in the second year of the 
agreement (which eventually translates into the equivalent proportion of additional staff) and 
the subsequent 3 percent cost to hire an additional 10 percent of staff in the third year of the 
agreement (see calculation in section 8). Although it has not been highlighted in Table 7 above, 
a 4 percent wage adjustment that accompanies a reduction in working hours with the 
requirement of employing additional staff, exerts a real impact on employment costs of 1.29 
percent for 2001 and 1.81 percent for 2002 respectively. These values are calculated from the 
extreme right hand column in Table 7. The calculation is generated on the assumption that the 
level of inflation for the entire period of the adjustment will average at 5.5 percent per annum.
' If the annual wage award to all security employees for the period of the adjustments in hours is 
fixed at 6.5 percent, the cost impact on employers will be 9.43 percent for the second year of 
the Sectoral Determination Agreement and 9.70 percent for the third year. Again, this includes 
the 2.75 percent cost adjustment to hire 9.09 percent more staff in the second year of the 
agreement and the subsequent 3 percent cost to hire an additional 10 percent of staff in the 
third year of the agreement (see calculation in section 8). A 6.5 percent wage adjustment that 
accompanies the reduction in hours and the employment of additional staff has a real impact 
on the costs of employment of 3.72 percent for 2001 and 4.26 percent for 2002 respectively. 
Assuming a constant inflation rate of 5.5 percent for the period of the adjustment, the changes 
in the real cost of employment are shown in the extreme right hand column of Table 7.
' If the annual wage awards to all security employees for the period of the adjustments in hours 
is fixed at 8 percent, the cost impact on employers will be 10.97 percent for the second year of 
the Sectoral Determination Agreement and 11.24 percent for the third year. As mentioned 
previously, this includes the 2.75 percent cost adjustment to hire 9.09 percent more staff in the 
second year of the agreement and the subsequent 3 percent cost to hire an additional 10 
percent of staff in the third year of the agreement (see calculation in section 8). Finally, the real 
impact on the costs of employment of an 8 percent wage adjustment that coincides with a 
reduction in working hours thereby necessitating the employment of additional staff in the 
security sector will amount to 5.18 
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Table 7: Monthly costs to employer (Rands) on full-time operational cycle (728 hours per month) and the effects
of introducing a shorter working week combined with a 4%, 6.5% and 8% annual salary adustment
Period of Agreement Detail (on 4% salary adjustment)
Detail (on 6.5% salary adjustment)
Detail (on 8% salary adjustment)
% Cost Change Monthly Cost Cost Impact Real Cost Value 
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1) 4645.03 4645.03
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + 4% Increment 2.75% + 4% 4963.68 6.86% 4704.91
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 Hour Week + 4% Increment 3% + 4% 5317.09 7.12% 4790.17
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1) 4645.03 4645.03
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + 6.5% Increment 2.75% + 6.5% 5083 9.43% 4818.01
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 Hour Week + 6.5% Increment 3% + 6.5% 5575.8 9.70% 5023.24
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1) 4645.03 4645.03
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + 8% Increment 2.75% + 8% 5154.59 10.97% 4885.87
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 Hour Week + 8% Increment 3% + 8% 5733.97 11.24% 5165.74
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percent in 2001 and 5.73 percent in 2002. These percentage changes are calculated from the 
values shown in the extreme right hand column of Table 7. The simulation is generated on the 
assumption that the average inflation rate over the period of the adjustment will amount to 5.5 
percent per annum.
b) Claims of Employers
Referring to the reduction in working hours for security officers from 55 to 50 per week, the 
submission from the Joint Professional Security Employer Alliance to the Employment Conditions 
Commission contains the following claim:
‘Contrary to other industries, this reduction in hours will necessitate the
employment of 20 percent more employees, just to service existing 
contractual obligations, with significant cost implications. While such job 
creation is laudable and strongly supports existing national policy, the cost 
thereof cannot be borne by the employer  alone and similarly, cannot be 
passed on to the client’.(p.4)
Now the evidence that we have deployed demonstrates that the cost to employers does not 
increase at the same rate as the demand for new employees who are required to fill the 
postswhich become available because of the decrease in the level of working hours. But 
assuming that the claims about the proportion of new employers required to fill the shortfall in 
vacancies caused by the reduction in working hours is indeed 20 percent, and therefore double 
the calculations that I am advancing, it does not translate into an equivalent increase in costs to 
employers. This has been the gist of our calculating procedure, which we have demonstrated 
above. A 20 percent increase in the proportion of new staff employed will have roughly double the 
impact that our own calculations show. Excluding adjustments for inflation and price changes, if 20 
percent more staff are employed the direct costs borne by employers will increase by 5.5 percent 
in the second year of the Sectoral Determination Agreement and by 6 percent in the third year.
Through a simple tabulating exercise, it can be shown how the real employment gains can be 
achieved in the Security Sector if the principle of ‘lower pay for fewer hours’ is adopted. It has to be 
borne in mind that the ‘lower pay for fewer hours’ actually means that the hourly rate of 
remuneration will remain unchanged but the aggregate salary or wage will fall as the level of 
working hours is reduced. This merely reinforces the substance of the argument that we have 
developed thus far. Even though the rationality for the calculation is tantamount to invoking the 
antiquated theory of the wages fund, such a calculation has pertinence for showing employment 
adjustment in the short-term. It is also likely to be used in forecasts of salary and wage 
expenditures in firms and hence serve as a mechanism for decisions on the emergency hiring of 
staff.
Taking into account that the current labour force for security workers is 188383 and assuming that 
on the aggregate a 55 hour week is normal, a reduction in working hours from 55 hours to 50 hours 
will have the following effect:
On a working week of 55 hours, a workforce of 188383 security officers contributes 10 361 065 
hours in services to the sector. When the working week is 50 hours the same 188383 security 
officers contribute 9 419 150 hours to the sector. The number of hours that cannot be occupied by 
the existing workforce amounts to 941 915 hours. This means that a manpower shortage in the 
industry would have developed which would be registered as employment vacancies. Assuming 
that hiring and non-remunerative costs are zero, it means that the 941915 hours that employers 
have committed to honour their wage bill can be utilised to generate an additional 18838 jobs in 
2001 on a working week schedule of 50 hours at no extra cost.
8.  Employment Gains as a result of the Principle of ‘Lower Pay for  
     Fewer Hours’
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Therefore at 50 hours, a workforce of 207221 contributes 10 361050 hours of service to the sector. 
The simulation relates only to the working hours reduction/employment expansion elasticity. It 
therefore ignores exogenous growth and employment expansion that would have taken place in 
the sector even if the reduction in working hours had not taken place. If the working week is 
reduced to 45 hours the same 207221 security officers can only contribute 9324 945 hours to the 
sector. This means that there is a shortfall of 1 036 105 hours that cannot be occupied by the 
existing workforce. Based on our assumptions this means that 23025 new jobs can be generated 
in 2002 at no extra cost to the wage bill. This is equivalent to an 11.11 percent increment in the size 
of the workforce. The gain in new jobs translates into an overall workforce of 230246 security 
officers for the sector.
The effect of the employment changes brought about by a reduction in working hours on the 
principle of ‘lower pay for fewer hours’ is illustrated in Table 8. While the evidence suggests that this 
is the most likely scenario for the future, it also allows inferences to be made about the reasons for 
the growth in the employment levels of security officers since the end of 1999. Although the 
information is not readily available to us, it can be said with confidence that the positive growth in 
the number of security personnel during 2000 can be attributed largely to the growth in service 
obligations that were made previously under the conditions of longer working hours. Employers 
still have to meet those obligations and perform the service. The reduction in working hours from 
60 hours to 55 hours per week therefore required an expansion in employment. Assuming that 
hiring costs were zero, and that the number of service hours rendered was exactly the same as it is 
currently (i.e. 10361065 hours), this means that the reduction in normal hours from 60 to 55 in the 
year 2000, increased employment from 172684 (which we assume as the estimate for 
employment in the industry for 1999) to 188383. As a percentage increase in employment this 
amounts to 9.09 percent.
Despite the endogenous growth trends which the security sector has been experiencing 
throughout the 1990s, part of this is due to the relatively modest increases in real hourly wage rates 
that has prevailed despite the reduction in the length of normal working hours. This is largely 
because all the parties to the trilateral process tacitly acceptance the principle of ‘lower pay for 
fewer hours’. The immediate reduction in the aggregate wage costs to employers operates in 
tandem with a positive working hours reduction/employment elasticity which contributes to 
employment being created as the reduction in working hours takes effect. Exogenous factors that 
have contributed to the growth of the security sector includes the phenomenon of the growth in 
services, the restructuring of the police force with more emphasis being placed on policing and 
less on guarding and protection as well as the growth of crime in the society generally.
Where it can be demonstrated that full compliance to the new regulations on working hours is 
indeed taking place, the phenomenon of ‘lower pay for fewer hours’ coexists with evidence of a 
growth in employment numbers and confirms the theory on which the analysis is postulated. The 
evidence will show that the expansion of employment has not led to a dramatic change in real 
labour unit costs and indeed this is one of the central reasons for the positive expansion of 
employment in the sector.
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Year Length of 
Working 
Week 
New Jobs Generated after 
the reduction in the length 
of the working week 
Size of Labour Force 
after the reduction in 




2000 55 hours 15699 188383 9.09 
2001 50 hours 18838 207221 10.0 
2002 45 hours 23025 230246 11.11 
 
Table 8: Employment Gains of a reduction in working hours on the principle of
‘lower pay for fewer hours’
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9.  Impact of ‘Lower Pay for Fewer Hours’on Employee 
Remuneration
The analysis shows that adopting the principle of ‘lower pay for fewer hours’ contributes to 
changes in the costs of employment which range from 2.75percent in the second year of the 
change (2001) to 3 percent in the third year (2002). Yet, it generates a growth in employment of 
9.09 percent and 10 percent respectively, or 10 percent and 11.11 percent as the more precise 
calculations in Table 8 show. However, the comparatively large reduction in working hours, even if 
matched by an incremental increase in the annual bonus, which employees derive, does not 
compensate adequately for the loss of earnings, which they would sustain.
The reductions in the length of normal working hours for security workers is taking place within a 
national milieu of inflation targeting that is being set by the Reserve Bank at below 6 percent per 
annum. The wage awards required to prevent the nominal wage and salary compensation of 
security workers from lagging behind receipts obtained a year previously in 2000 can therefore be 
projected to be either equal or slightly above this figure. We can assume that the wage awards for 
security workers will therefore hover slightly above the Reserve Bank inflation targets. Assuming 
that an inflation targets of 5.5 percent will be met, it is not unrealistic to postulate wage growth on a 
6.5 percent annual increment. This means that the 6.5 percent award is being simulated at roughly 
1 percent above the anticipated rate of inflation. If the period over which the simulations for the 
reduction in working hours are extended from three years (scenario 1 which is the time-frame 
specified in Sectoral Determination 3) to four years (scenario 2), the effect on nominal wages is 
partially mitigated.
The Tables, which follow, simulate the effect of the reduction in working hours using the principle of 
‘lower pay for fewer hours’ which essentially means that the reduction in working hours will 
contribute to lower absolute pay because the hourly rates of remuneration have remained 
unchanged.
In Table 9, the nominal wage effect of the shorter working week is stimulated on an annual salary 
increment of 6.5 percent. A 6.5 percent annual salary increment was chosen for the simulation 
because it represents a modest gain of 1 percent above the anticipated inflation rate for 
employees. It is noticeable that with a 6.5 percent annual salary increment, (scenario one) the 
nominal wage that employees receive when a 45 hours working week is obtained is almost exactly 
equivalent to what it was during the first year of the working time reduction when a 55 hour working 
week prevailed. If the reduction in working hours is extended over an additional year (scenario 2), 
the nominal wage that the Sectoral Determination allows for in the fourth and final year of the 
reduction is roughly 8 percent higher than at the start in the first year of the agreement. The 
simulation however presumes that the hourly rates of remuneration are not affected by the 
reduction in the level of hours: the simulations merely incorporate the incremental adjustment in 
the rate of remuneration that occurs naturally through annual collective bargaining.
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Table 9: Nominal Effect on Monthly Salary and Wages of Security Officers of a 
Shorter Working Week with a 6.5% annual salary increment
Area 1
Period of Agreement Detail
Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D Grade E Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D Grade E
55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
50 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3318.52 2723.30 2011.36 1786.69 1667.06 0.27 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.06
45 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3306.79 2715.08 2006.13 1782.54 1668.01 -0.08 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.11
55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
50 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3318.52 2723.30 2011.36 1786.69 1667.06 0.27 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.06









Yr 4: 25/2/2003-24/2/2004 45 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3568.42 2927.52 2165.07 1921.97 1797.66 7.82 7.86 8.03 7.93 7.90
Security Officers % Change Per annnum
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In Table10, despite an allowance being made for a 4 percent annual salary increment for 
security officers, the impact on employee remuneration in the third year when a 45 hour week 
has been achieved, is a 4.5 percent reduction in nominal wages.
This applies to all grades of security workers in all of the five geographical areas (as is shown in the 
Appendix) to which the Sectoral Determination applies. However, if the period for the 
implementation of the agreement is extended over an extra year (scenario two), the impact is that 
the overall nominal remuneration of employees will remain the same as it was at the start of the 
reduction in working hours.
Table 11 shows that when the phased reduction in working hours for security workers corresponds 
with an 8 percent annual salary and wage increment, nominal wages under scenario one, will 
increase by roughly 3 percent. Over the longer period in which the reduction is possible (scenario 
2), the nominal wages will increase by up to 12.5 percent in the last year from what it was at the 
start.
Although the reduction in the length of the normal working week from 55 hours 50 in 2001 and 
again from 50 to 45 in 2002 imposes a cost on employers of approximately 2.75 percent over the 
succeeding year, it is accompanied by a significant growth in new employment generated. For 
employers, the pressure however as was illustrated in Table 7 will be on finding appropriate ways 
of containing inflationary adjustments from employees and trade unions in the sector. But the fact 
that the wage awards that are agreed to during the forthcoming round of wage bargaining between 
employers and trade unions are required to match the price changes that have occurred over the 
year as well as reply to the dialogue that the reduction in hours imposes on the pay packets of 
workers in the sector, means that there will be added pressure for the trade unions to demand 
more than employers can afford to pay. Because, while the hourly wage rate of employees 
remains largely the same, except for adjustments reflecting the annual inflation adjustment, the 
absolute wage and salary package falls as working hours are reduced. If the simulations are 
performed on the impact that the adjustment in working hours has on the real wage and salary 
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Table 10: Effect on Monthly Salary and Wages of Security Officers of a Shorter 
Working Week with a 4% annual salary increment
Area 1
Period of Agreement Detail
Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D Grade E Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D Grade E
Scenario 1
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 hr week + 4% Increment 3241.28 2657.72 1963.29 1744.46 1633.58 -2.06 -2.08 -2.04 -2.04 -1.95
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 hr week + 4% Increment 3154.35 2587.18 1910.95 1698.26 1591.92 -4.69 -4.68 -4.65 -4.64 -4.45
Scenario 2
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 hr week + 4% Increment 3241.28 2657.72 1963.29 1744.46 1633.58 -2.06 -2.08 -2.04 -2.04 -1.95
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 48 hr week + 4% Increment 3311.90 2715.94 2005.37 1781.89 1670.14 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.24
Yr 4: 25/2/2003-24/2/2004 45 hr week + 4% Increment 3324.19 2724.72 2012.00 1788.24 1677.74 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.70
Security Officers % Change Per annnum
 
Table 11: Effect on Monthly Salary and Wages of Security Officers of a Shorter 
Working Week with a 8% annual salary increment
Area 1
Period of Agreement Detail
Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D Grade E Grade A Grade BGrade CGrade D Grade E
Scenario 1
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 hr week + 8% Increment 3365.90 2761.92 2038.31 1813.64 1696.93 1.70 1.76 1.71 1.84 1.85
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 hr week + 8% Increment 3401.23 2790.44 2059.67 1833.35 1716.10 2.77 2.81 2.77 2.95 3.00
Scenario 2
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 hr week + 8% Increment 3365.90 2761.92 2038.31 1813.64 1696.93 1.70 1.76 1.71 1.84 1.85
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 48 hr week + 8% Increment 3571.11 2929.31 2161.43 1923.62 1800.42 7.90 7.93 7.85 8.02 8.06
Yr 4: 25/2/2003-24/2/2004 45 hr week + 8% Increment 3720.37 3051.85 2253.49 2004.86 1877.79 12.41 12.44 12.44 12.58 12.71
Security Officers % Change Per annnum
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compensation of security officers, the quandary for industrial relations stability appears to be even 
more difficult. Without the mediation of state structures to resolve the impasse, there is no 
guarantee that employer organisations and worker organisations will see eye to eye on this 
particular matter.
It appears that a wage increment that is 1 percent above the rate of anticipated inflation is 
necessary to defend and mitigate the nominal loss of earnings, which the shortening of the 
working week entails. This applies in particular if the reduction in working hours reduces the 
aggregate level of wages and salaries. In practice, the principle of ‘lower pay for fewer hours’ 
leaves the hourly rate of remuneration unchanged but leads to a reduction in the absolute wage 
and salary compensations that workers obtain.
A much clearer picture can be obtained by simulating the real effect of expected price changes on 
the earnings of employees that result from a reduction in working hours, particularly when the 
annual size of the reduction in working hours is roughly 10 percent per annum. Now the 
simulations, which account for inflationary shifts are based on arbitrary amounts. In fact inflation 
can be either higher or lower than the constant 5.5 percent  that we have chosen for the simulation. 
The point that should be carried across is that even in instances where the aggregate nominal 
wages and salaries of employees is retained, the effect in real terms of a reduction in working 
hours leads to a significant decline in the real wage and salary compensation of employees. While 
real earnings depreciate, it is unlikely for employees to have the illusion about the worth of their 
earnings simply because their aggregate nominal earnings has remained unchanged. The effect 
of real prices will certainly shatter this illusion. However as was shown above, the reduction in 
working hours without dramatic shifts in the costs to employers can lead to a substantial increase 
in employment. This is due to the positive substitution that exists between the reduction in the 
length of working hours when the principle of ‘lower pay for fewer hours’ is adopted and the growth 
in employment that arises from firms based in the industry. These firms will continue to hire 
additional staff in order to maintain the services, which they have been performing.
Table 12 therefore shows the real impact on aggregate earnings, which the reduction of working 
hours has on security workers in the sector. The simulations incorporate a 6.5 percent nominal 
wage adjustment that is 1 percent  above the anticipated level of inflation, which has been 
simulated at 5.5 percent per annum, but in fact may either be higher or lower. The aggregate real 
earnings in Table 12 refers to security workers in Area 1 of the Sectoral Determination Agreement. 
With a 50 hour normal working week, despite obtaining a nominal wage adjustment of 6.5 percent, 
aggregate real wages for security officers who had previously worked 55 hours will have declined 
by 5 percent in the second year of the Sectoral Determination. With the same inflation rate and a 
marginally higher nominal wage and salary adjustment, aggregate earnings under a 45 hours 
working week will have declined by 10 percent in real terms to what it was during the first year 
when a 55 hour working week was the norm.
10.  Real Wage Effect of ‘Lower Pay for Fewer Hours’
16
 
Table 12: Real Effect on Monthly Salary & Wages of Security Officers of a Shorter 
Working Week with a 6.5% annual increment
Area 1
Period of Agreement Detail Real Effect of a 5.5% Annual Price Rise
Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D Grade E Grade AGrade BGrade C Grade D Grade E
Scenario 1
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3145.52 2581.33 1906.50 1693.55 1580.15 -4.96 -4.90 -4.87 -4.90 -5.16
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 hr week + 6.5% Increment 2979.09 2446.02 1807.32 1605.89 1502.71 -9.99 -9.88 -9.82 -9.82 -9.81
Scenario 2
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3145.52 2581.33 1906.50 1693.55 1580.15 -4.96 -4.90 -4.87 -4.90 -5.16
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 48 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3127.89 2567.76 1896.63 1684.96 1576.56 -5.49 -5.40 -5.36 -5.38 -5.37
Yr 4: 25/2/2003-24/2/2004 45 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3063.02 2512.89 1858.43 1649.76 1543.06 -7.45 -7.42 -7.27 -7.36 -7.39
% Real Change Per annnum
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The real effect of this erosion on the aggregate monthly salary of security officers is shown 
graphically in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the different grades of security officers are depicted from 1 to 5 
but these represent all the grades from A at the  upper end to E at the lower end of the salary scale.  
Similar simulations are shown in Table 13 and 14.  In Table 13 the annual wage increment is 
simulated to be 4.5 percent or 1.5 percent lower than the annual rate of inflation. Under such 
conditions, the impact on the real earnings of security workers, which the reduction in working 
hours induces, is significantly more severe. When the length of the working week is reduced from 
55 to 50 hours real wages show a decline of approximately 7 percent. On a 45 hour working week 
the reduction in real remuneration is roughly 14 percent.
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Grades of Security Officers in Industry
55 hour working week
50 hour working week
45 hour working week
55 hour working week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10
50 hour working week 3145.52 2581.33 1906.50 1693.55 1580.15
45 hour working week 2979.09 2446.02 1807.32 1605.89 1502.71
1 2 3 4 5
 
Table 13: Real Effect on Monthly Salary and Wages of Security Officers of a 
Shorter Working Week with a 4% annual increment
Area 1
Period of Agreement Detail Real Effect of a 5.5% Annual Price Rise
Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D Grade E Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D Grade E
Scenario 1
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 hr week + 4% Increment 3072.30 2519.17 1860.94 1653.52 1548.42 -7.17 -7.19 -7.14 -7.15 -7.06
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 hr week + 4% Increment 2841.76 2330.79 1721.58 1529.96 1434.16 -14.13 -14.13 -14.10 -14.09 -13.92
Scenario 2
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 hr week + 4% Increment 3072.30 2519.17 1860.94 1653.52 1548.42 -7.17 -7.19 -7.14 -7.15 -7.06
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 48 hr week + 4% Increment 2983.69 2446.79 1806.64 1605.31 1504.63 -9.85 -9.85 -9.85 -9.86 -9.69
Yr 4: 25/2/2003-24/2/2004 45 hr week + 4% Increment 2853.38 2338.82 1727.04 1534.97 1440.12 -13.78 -13.83 -13.82 -13.81 -13.56
% Real Change Per annnum
Special Problems in Securing a Reduction in Working Hours: The Case of Security Workers
Even with a more generous annual wage increment of 8 percent, an adjustment that is 2.5 percent 
above the simulated rate of inflation is not an adequate compensation for the defence of real 
incomes of security officers. When the length of normal working hours in a week is reduced from 
55 to 50 hours the real effect on aggregate income shows a reduction of roughly 3.5 percent. 
When the length of the working week is reduced further from 50 to 45 hours, the impact on real 
aggregate income for security workers continues to show a decline to roughly 7 percent. Even 
when the period over which the reduction in normal working hours is implemented over a longer 
time frame – 4 years – instead of the 3 years that is allowed in the Sectoral Determination 
Agreement, the impact shown as scenario 2 in the Table 14 is only partially mitigated.
As was illustrated above in Figure 1 where the salary and wage rates of security workers exhibited 
substantial erosion even when the annual increment was 6.5 percent, the effect is mitigated but 
not absent when the annual inflationary increment is simulated at 8 percent. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2.
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Table 14: Real Effect on Monthly Salary and Wages of Security Officers of a 
Shorter Working Week with a 8% annual increment
Area 1
Period of Agreement Detail Real Effect of a 5.5% Annual Price Rise
Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D Grade E Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D Grade E
Scenario 1
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3190.43 2617.93 1932.05 1719.09 1608.46 -3.60 -3.55 -3.59 -3.47 -3.46
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3064.17 2513.91 1855.56 1651.67 1546.04 -7.41 -7.38 -7.41 -7.25 -7.21
Scenario 2
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 hr week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3190.43 2617.93 1932.05 1719.09 1608.46 -3.60 -3.55 -3.59 -3.47 -3.46
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 48 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3217.22 2639.02 1947.23 1732.99 1622.00 -2.79 -2.77 -2.84 -2.69 -2.65
Yr 4: 25/2/2003-24/2/2004 45 hr week + 6.5% Increment 3193.45 2619.61 1934.33 1720.91 1611.84 -3.51 -3.48 -3.48 -3.36 -3.26
% Real Change Per annnum










Grades of Security Officers in Industry
55 hour working week
50 hour working week
45 hour working week
55 hour working week 3309.56 2714.19 2004.09 1780.83 1666.10
50 hour working week 3190.43 2617.93 1932.05 1719.09 1608.46
45 hour working week 3064.17 2513.91 1855.56 1651.67 1546.04
1 2 3 4 5
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A summary of the trends observed in the Tables 12, 13 and 14 and Figures 1 and 2 illustrate 
the following points:
' The impact on real wage levels of a reduction in working hours where a 6.5 percent annual 
salary increment prevails shows that real wages will decline by roughly 10 percent when the 
reduction in working hours extends over the three year cycle (scenario 1). Allowing for an 
extension of four years results in a real wage (over the remuneration levels in 2000) decline of 
roughly 7.5 percent.
' Mirroring conditions in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, effectively implies that the impact on real 
wages under a 4 percent annual increment is roughly similar. In both instances this results in a 
negative effect and a real wage decline of 14 percent and 13.5 percent respectively.
' Simulating the effect on real wages with an annual wage increment of 8 percent shows that a 
decline is recorded that varies from 7.5 percent in Scenario 1 to 3.5 percent in Scenario 2.
The short (three years) and long (four years) term scenarios, which we have deployed for 
illustrative purposes in Tables 12, 13 and 14, shows that the reduction in working hours as 
intended by the legislation has dual effects. It reduces the length of working hours to the norms 
which the majority of employees in other sectors of the economy experience, but the shift to a 
shorter working week regime, temporarily reduces the aggregate salary and wage earnings of 
security officers. But the net effect of the shift to shorter working hours has both positive and 
negative effects. The positive effect or benefit is undoubtedly the attainment of a reduction in the 
length of working hours. The negative effect or burden is the reduction in the aggregate salary and 
wage earnings for security officers that results from the reduction in working hours.
Under conditions where the principle of ‘equal pay for fewer hours’ influences the tabulation of cost 
to employers that a reduction in working hours imposes, the basis of the calculation will change. 
The impact on costs to employers will rise proportionately in relation to the decline in the level of 
working hours because employees would be earning exactly the same amount working fewer 
hours than they earned before working longer hours. ‘Equal pay for fewer hours’, means that 
aggregate employee remuneration remains the same but their hourly rate of remuneration 
increases.
The above costs however make provision for all shift work and the maximum level of over-time that 
each security officer can work during a monthly cycle. Excluding annual salary adjustments to 
employees, the reduction in working hours from 55 to 50 represents a 9.09 percent increase in 
costs to employers. Similarly, a reduction from 50 to 45 hours results in a 10 percent increase in 
employment costs. This impact on costs is ameliorated to some extent when the reductions are 
extended over a longer period.
Table 15 illustrates the impact of a 6.5 percent annual salary adjustment. Combined with a 
reduction in working hours according to the targets specified in the Sectoral Determination, a 6.5 
percent salary adjustment will give rise to a 16 percent annual increase in the costs of employment 
in the first year. The increase in the cost of employment rises even further to 17 percent in the 
second year. An attempt to mitigate the rapid escalation in wage and salary costs that follows a 
reduction in working hours based on the principle of ‘equal pay for fewer hours’, by attaining the 45 
hours target for the level of working hours over four years instead of three only exerts a partial limit 
on the growth in the costs of employment.
11.  Costs to Employers using the Principle of ‘Equal Pay for Fewer   
       Hours’
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The situation does not alter fundamentally as the comparison simulated on a 4 percent annual 
wage and salary adjustment in Table 16 shows. The reason for this significant impact on the cost of 
employment despite the modest annual wage increment that falls below the simulated rate of 
inflation is because the principle of 'equal pay for fewer hours' automatically results in the cost of 
employment increasing by the same ratio that the level of working hours is reduced. As is 
illustrated above, the reduction in working hours from 55 to 50 immediately increase costs by 9.09 
percent. When working hours are reduced further from 50 to 45 hours per week, the immediate 
increase in the costs of employment are measured at 10 percent. Equal pay for fewer hours results 
in the aggregate salary and wage compensation to employees being the same after the reduction 
in working hours to what it was before the reduction.  Therefore a 4 percent annual wage 
adjustment will have a 13.45 percent impact on the costs of employment when normal working 
hours are reduced to 50 hours and a 14.40 percent impact when it is reduced further to 45 hours.
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Table 15: Monthly Costs to Employer (Rands) per Position held on Full-time 
Operational Cycle (728 hours per month) and the Effects of Introducing a 
Shorter Working Week combined with a 6.5% Annual Salary Adjustment
Period of Agreement Detail % Change in CostsMonthly Cost/Full-time OperationCost Impact
Scenario 1
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1) 4645.03
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + 6.5% Increment 9.09% + 6.5% 5396.64 16.18%
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 Hour Week + 6.5% Increment 10% + 6.5% 6322.16 17.15%
Scenario 2
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1) 4645.03
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + 6.5% Increment 9.09% + 6.5% 5396.64 16.18%
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 48 Hour Week + 6.5% Increment 4% + 6.5% 5977.32 10.76%
Yr 4: 25/2/2003-24/2/2004 45 Hour Week + 6.5% Increment 6.25% + 6.5% 6763.71 13.17%
Table 16: Monthly Costs to Employer (Rands) per Position held on Full-time 
Operational Cycle (728 hours per month) and the Effects of Introducing a 
Shorter Working Week combined with a 4% Annual Salary Adjustment
Period of Agreement Detail % Change in Costs Monthly Cost/Full-time Operation Cost Impact
Scenario 1
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1) 4645.03
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + 4% Increment 9.09% + 4% 5269.95 13.45%
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 Hour Week + 4% Increment 10% + 4% 6028.82 14.40%
Scenario 2
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1) 4645.03
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + 4% Increment 9.09% +4% 5269.95 13.45%
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 48 Hour Week + 4% Increment 4% + 4% 5699.98 8.16%
Yr 4: 25/2/2003-24/2/2004 45 Hour Week + 4% Increment 6.25% + 4% 6298.48 10.50%
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Finally Table 17 highlights the cost impact for employers, which result from a shorter working week 
and an 8 percent adjustment in salary over the previous rate. It can be seen that the 8 percent 
adjustment merely aggravates the high escalation in employment costs associated with the 
principle of 'equal pay for fewer hours'. The high costs which this would impose on firms will serve 
as a major barrier to profitability and in the context of the competitive nature of the industry will 
serve as a major reason for encouraging firms to scale down their operations or exit from the 
industry altogether.
Table 18 consolidates the results illustrated in Tables 15, 16 and 17. Naturally, employers will be 
inclined to maintain annual salary adjustments for employees at the lowest level to accommodate 
the costs of complying to shorter normal working hours for security officers. But even adherence to 
an annual salary adjustment of 4 percent will contribute to annual employment cost rises that 
exceed 13 percent and this is more than double the simulated inflation rate of 5.5 percent which 
closely mirrors the targets set by the Reserve Bank. Unless the burden of the escalation in the 
costs of employment are shifted to consumers of security services, which is most unlikely in the 
competitive environment of the sector, the burden borne by employers will lead to a cut-back in 
services and probably even greater pressure on security officers to increase productivity.
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Period of Agreement Detail % Change in Costs Monthly Cost/Full-time Operation Cost Impact
Scenario 1
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1) 4645.03
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + 8% Increment 9.09% + 8% 5472.64 17.82%
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 Hour Week + 8% Increment 10% + 8% 6501.5 18.80%
Scenario 2
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1) 4645.03
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + 8% Increment 9.09% + 8% 5472.64 17.82%
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 48 Hour Week + 8% Increment 4% + 8% 6146.87 12.32%
Yr 4: 25/2/2003-24/2/2004 45 Hour Week + 8% Increment 6.25% + 8% 7053.53 14.75%
Table 17: Monthly Costs to Employer (Rands) per Position held on Full-time 
Operational Cycle (728 hours per month) and the Effects of Introducing a 
Shorter Working Week combined with a 8% Annual Salary Adjustment
 
Table 18: Cost to Employers of Reduced Working Hours Combined with 
Annual Salary Adjustments (Adjustments calculated on principle of 'equal 
pay for fewer hours')
Period of Agreement Detail Cost Impact on 4%
Salary Increment
Cost Impact on 6.5%
Salary Increment
Cost Impact on 8%
Salary Increment
Scenario 1
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1)
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + Salary Increment 13.45% 16.18% 17.82%
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 45 Hour Week + Salary Increment 14.40% 17.15% 18.80%
Scenario 2
Yr 1: 25/2/2000-24/2/2001 55 Hour Week (Year 1)
Yr 2: 25/2/2001-24/2/2002 50 Hour Week + Salary Increment 13.45% 16.18% 17.82%
Yr 3: 25/2/2002-24/2/2003 48 Hour Week + Increment Increment 8.16% 10.76% 12.32%
Yr 4: 25/2/2003-24/2/2004 45 Hour Week + Increment Increment 10.50% 13.17% 14.75%
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12.  Employment Losses as a Result of the Principle of ‘Equal Pay 
for Fewer Hours’
Using the short-run and long-run wage employment elasticities which have been calculated for the 
South African economy by the World Bank (Fallon & Lucas), simulations of the increments of real 
wages to job losses can be derived for the short-run and the long run. While we do not have precise 
values of the price demand elasticity for the Security sector, the World Bank data is the best 
available measure for South Africa. Except for Black employees in Agriculture, these elasticities 
cover formal sector employment for the period 1961-1993. The average estimate for long-run 
aggregate wage-employment elasticity for the period is -0.71 and the average estimate for the 
short-run (impact) elasticity is -0.156. The comparative static nature of the exercise limits the 
simulation to the first round disemployment effects of a real wage increase (in this case it is a real 
increase in the unit costs of labour). This means that the disemployment effects can only be 
simulated for the first phase of the reduction in working hours, which is from 55 hours to 50 hours. 
But the simulation compels a realistic assessment to be made of the principle of ‘equal pay for 
fewer hours’, because the disemployment effects in the short-run are real and these reverberate 
towards more damaging effects in the long run as additional jobs are lost. The cost of the reduction 
in working hours to employers, and the price sensitivity of the users of security services to price 
shocks will lead to firms that are not able to extract the necessary productivity gains to neutralise 
the real increase in costs becoming uncompetitive. As a result such firms will begin to lose 
contracts and will therefore be required to retrench staff. In instances where the adjustments in 
staff complements are not adequate to raise the operating margins, firms will become unprofitable 
and will hence be required to exit the sector.
So therefore the attempt to preserve the monthly wage and salary earnings to what it was before 
the reduction in normal working hours so that it coexists with an incremental wage increase of 
either 4 percent, 6.5 percent or 8 percent is shown in Table 19. Using the rate of inflation as a proxy 
of the real increase in wages that are due to the combined effect of the reduction in working hours 
and the wage increment which will be negotiated at the annual pay round, will lead to short-term 
nominal price shocks of 13.45 percent,16.18 percent and 17.82 percent respectively. The full 
percentage value of the increase has been deflated by an estimate of the rate of inflation in order to 
derive the real percentage increase in the costs of the wage bill to employers. Using the short-run 
wage-employment point elasticity of -0.156 on a prevailing employment level for the sector shows 
that 2336 jobs are lost when a 4 percent wage increment follows the principle of ‘equal pay for 
fewer hours’ which defends the aggregate wage and salary compensation of employees. Under 
the same principles, a wage increment of 6.5 percent will lead to the employment loss of 3127 jobs 
among security officers in the short-term, accounting for 1.66 percent of the current labour force. 
This implies that a 6.5 percent wage increment with the associated conditions that we have 
discussed will lead to aggregate short-term employment declining from 188383 security officers to 
185256. Adhering to the principle of ‘equal pay for fewer hours’, means that for every increase in 
the wage increment, an effect consistent with the elasticity factor will lead to disemployment 
effects which will finally resonate on the aggregate level of total employment.
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Table 19: Simulated Short-run Employment Effect of 'Equal Pay for Fewer Hours’
Wage Number of Real %  Increase Job Losses







4% 188383 13.45%-5.5% = 7.95% 0.156 1.24 2336 1.24
6.50% 188383 16.18%-5.5% = 10.68% 0.156 1.66 3127 1.66
8% 188383 17.82% - 5.5% = 12.32% 0.156 1.92 3617 1.92
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By extending the simulation of the disemployment effects to the long-run using the estimated wage 
-employment elasticity of -0.71 which is shown in Table 20, the disemployment effects of the 
changes in real unit costs will be more than four times more severe in the long-run than over the 
short-run. What appears to be a modest 4 percent wage increment, is actually significantly large in 
real terms under the ‘equal pay for fewer hours’ principle and in fact the higher long run elasticity 
contributes to a higher elasticity factor giving rise to larger job losses. At 4 percent therefore, 10625 
jobs will be lost in the long-run and this would lead to a shrinkage of employment for security 
officers from an aggregate of 188383 security officers to an aggregate of 177858. At 6.5 percent 
the disemployment effects will be even higher and 14279 job losses will occur which accounts for 
7.58 percent of aggregate employment. Similarly the disemployment effects in which the position 
of ‘equal pay for fewer hours’ is upheld and coincides with an additional 8 percent annual wage 
increment will destroy 8.75 percent of the available jobs of security workers.
The experience of systematically reducing working hours in the South African security sector 
highlights special problems that distinguishes it from similar processes that have occurred in 
developed countries, particularly those in Western Europe. Using a classification adumbrated by 
White (1987), the level of working hours for security workers prior to the process of reduction can 
be characterised as excessive. As was shown above, at least 60 percent of all security officers in 
the sector worked 60 hours or longer per week.
From a detached position, there appears to have been a range of contextual conditions that limited 
and deflected the initial objectives to achieving the reduction in working hours without adverse or 
deleterious effects being borne by either workers or employers. The relatively tight time frame set 
for the process of equilibrating the regime in working hours to that specified in the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act appears to have had unintended effects. The cycle of complementary effects 
operated in tandem with shifting the burden of the reduction onto the segment of the labour force 
that was supposed to celebrate the good intentions of the process.  At the crux of the matter is the 
difficulty of reconciling labour market rigidities around the compensation of employees on the one 
side so that it does not coincide with resistance by employers against bearing any responsibility for 
the cost burden. There is the danger that workers can resist a potential decline in wages at the 
same time that employers resist the increase in costs. The rigidity is one of incompatible interest 
but with actions that are complementary. The complementary character of the process is evident in 
the concept of ‘lower pay for fewer hours’ dictating the principle by which the reduction in working 
hours is being achieved. A corollary to achieving a reduction in working hours through the above, is 
the principle of ‘equal pay for fewer hours’. Essentially this would have implied that the onus for 
financing the reduction in working hours would have been borne by employers. Had this been the 
case, a reduction in working hours would have been obtained without affecting the wage or salary 
packets of workers. It would have resulted in the hourly rate of pay increasing in proportion to the 
reduction in the level of working hours. A middle ground, which could have been construed as 
being absolutely fair, would have been a sharing of the burden of working hours reduction between 
the employers and the workers. This appears to have happened rather implicitly in Sectoral 
Determination 3 where the ‘hours-dependent non-wage expenditure’ in the form of bonuses was 
13.  Lessons for Working Time Reductions
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4% 188383 13.45%-5.5% = 7.95% 0.71 5.64 10625 5.64
6.50% 188383 16.18%-5.5% = 10.68% 0.71 7.58 14279 7.58
8% 188383 17.82% - 5.5% = 12.32% 0.71 8.75 16484 8.75
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allowed to fluctuate upwards as a compensation to the observable fall in wages and salaries which 
the reduction entailed. Surprisingly, apart from the need to reduce the excessive long working 
hours of security workers, no other motivation or rationale appears to have prefigured the 
reduction in working hours: neither the accumulated benefits from productivity, nor the 
employment inducing effects were strenuously advocated.
It is obviously clear that the level of working hours for security workers was excessive. However, in 
the context of the significant reduction of earnings that security workers are exposed to, through 
the reduction in working hours, the level of working time reduction can be construed as being fairly 
drastic. One has to remember that the Basic Conditions of Employment Act imposes limits to which 
reduced working time can be substituted for higher remuneration from the working of overtime. In 
fact the simulations that I have used in this paper is based on the absolutely maximum level of 
overtime hours that security workers can work. In instances where the reduction in working hours 
has occurred through adherence to the concept of ‘equal pay for fewer hours’, the time-frame for 
the reductions have generally been longer and the level of the reduction in working hours has been 
a lot more modest.
Perhaps an explanation for the generally uncontested principle of the reduction in working hours 
being expressed through the notion of ‘ower pay for fewer hours’ is to be found in the strength and 
composition of the agents in the sector. The relatively low barriers to entry as was noted in the 
evidence above, has resulted in a highly competitive industry with low profit margins to firms. A 
similar trait characterises the nature of trade union organisation in the sector. Union competition 
for membership appears to be sharply concentrated in the large urban centres. These features 
have tended to weaken the degree of concentration and monopolisation among employers and 
unions alike. The impact of this is significantly more detrimental to the interests of employees. 
Hence the rather skewed orientation in the principles by which the reduction in working hours is 
being secured. It is therefore unlikely for the strategy of the reduction in working hours to have 
been attained solely through the powers and initiatives of either employers and employer 
organisations, or the organised workers in the sector. The accolades for this sterling achievement 
are due to the Ministry of Labour and its officials.
The adjustments in working hours and the shift in the length of the working week for security 
officers from 60 hours to 45 hours in four years represents a very drastic decline in working hours. 
Since the agreement makes provision for a fixed amount of hours by which the normal working 
week is shortened per annum (5 hours), over a period of four years (2000-2003), it has the effect of 
increasing the proportionate size in the yearly reduction. At a minimum, assuming that no salary 
increments are awarded, the impact on the real costs to employers will be rather small particularly 
if the conception on which the reduction in working hours takes place is implemented according to 
the principle of lower pay for fewer hours. Not only will the effects on the costs to employers remain 
within modest limits but the reduction in working hours will create employment to a ratio that 
corresponds to the level of the reduction in working hours. While employment gains will be a 
positive benefit, the impact on the real living standards of workers will be negative. The wage 
adjustment that has to be made to compensate for this loss is roughly in the region of 11.5 percent. 
But a 11.5 percent annual wage adjustment will not generate the degree of employment which our 
simulations have shown to be possible. Indeed, the significant reduction in the level of working 
hours (5 hours each year) will induce employees to demand compensation for their loss of 
earnings and this can only be achieved through a compensating increase in wages. Employers 
may argue that this imposes an unfair burden on their capacity to engage in profitable economic 
activities.
14.  Summary and Concluding Remarks
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1 See Paul Blyton, Changes in working time: an international review (London: Croom Helm, 1985) for European trends and
  John Owen, Working hours: an economic analysis (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1979) for American trends.
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While it is recognised that the reduction in working hours signifies a massive benefit to employees 
who work long hours, it should be noted that this recognition can only be appreciated by 
employees after they have understood the significance of the achievement. Unless they do so, 
they might resort to claims for a higher increment in their annual remuneration: and they will justify 
these claims because of a depreciation of their monthly earnings. It is for this reason that 
employees may advance wage claims that are above the changes in the price level for the period 
and duration in which the reduction in working hours are implemented. The real erosion in wages 
which security workers on the longer working hour schedules will experience, can lead to a difficult 
and conflictual industrial relations climate. A strategy to contain such a development would be 
contained in proposals that demonstrate how security officers can acquire promotion from lower to 
higher grades and where possible during the time period in which a shorter working hour regime is 
being implemented. Higher grades have a higher rate of compensation but are determined by 
qualifications recognised and controlled within the Security Sector.
On the other hand adherence to the conception of ‘equal pay for fewer hours’, as the justification 
for securing the historical value of wages and salaries and compensating this with the normal 
annual wage increment that corresponds or improves remuneration rates beyond the level of 
inflation will have disemployment effects. At higher wage increments the disemployment effects 
will be greater. The principle of ‘equal pay for fewer hours’ actually implies that the that the hourly 
wage rate that prevailed before the adjustment would in fact increase after the adjustment so that 
the aggregate wage remuneration adjustment is maintained to correspond with what it was before.
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